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Abstract - In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a 
parameterized family of effectivity functions having admissible (strong) weight-profiles as the relevant 
parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is 
consistent with strong core-stability of a neo-parliamentary or mixed semi-presidential government 
form provided that the majority formation rule is collegial.  
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Is there any eﬀective role for a constitutional umpire when the head of the exec-
utive is directly appointed by means of general elections? Is that role possibly
consistent with stability of the corresponding government form in multiparty
and/or two-party systems?
Such issues, and related ones, have been hotly debated in recent years in Italy
as well in other Countries where constitutional reform has been on the public
agenda. The general presumptions underlying those debates are apparently that
i) guaranteeing stability and eﬀectiveness of the executive is a crucial priority,
ii) enhancing electoral control on coalition formation in multi-party par-
liamentary systems -and related ones such as semi—presidential systems where
the cabinet if not the head of the executive herself can be demoted by a non-
conﬁdence vote- is also desirable, and
iii) direct election of the prime minister should be considered as a promising
constitutional device to help achieve both.
Those views may be not compelling, but they are in any case popular enough
to be deﬁnitely worth analyzing and probing from a mechanism design perspec-
tive.
Indeed, the foregoing problems of constitutional design -I submit- amount to
well-deﬁned implementation problems: therefore, they are in principle perfectly
amenable to a mechanism-design treatment. As a matter of fact, a general im-
plementation problem consists of three main components: a success criterion,a
game format,a n dasolution concept. The success criterion speciﬁes the choice
rule to be implemented i.e. the performance to be achieved including of course
the environment to be considered. The game format speciﬁes the required type
of description of the implementing mechanism, e.g. whether actions available
to players are to be explicitly described and, if so, whether they should embody
in an essential way a sequential structure or not. Finally, the solution concept
speciﬁes the way the games induced by the implementing mechanism should
be solved, and amounts to a theory of well-adapted behaviour for the ensuing
interactive situations. In the family of constitutional design problems we are
about to consider, the success criterion amounts to non-empty-valuedness and
Pareto eﬃciency of the choice correspondence as deﬁn e do nal a r g ed o m a i no f
preference proﬁles of the relevant players (where preferences are suitably deﬁned
over the policy-outcome space). In order to focus on general guidelines concern-
i n g‘ w h oc a nd ow h a t ’t ot h ee ﬀect of avoiding committment to speciﬁcs t r a t e g y
spaces while at the same time enhancing tractability we look for implementation
by coalitional game forms w h i c hi nt u r ns t r o n g l ys u g g e s tr e l i a n c eo ns oc a l l e d
‘cooperative’ solutions such as the core and related notions.
In particular, in this paper a government form is modeled as an eﬀectivity
function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of eﬀectivity functions hav-
ing admissible weight-proﬁles as the relevant parameters. In this setting, the
‘stability problem’ for government forms can be aptly re-formulated in terms
of strong core-stability of the resulting eﬀectivity functions over a large domain
of preference proﬁles on the outcome/policy space. Thus, under the suggested
1interpretation the stability problem for government forms reduces to a (family
of) implementation problems in a coalitional format with a reﬁned version of
the core we call ‘strong core’ as a solution concept and non-emptiness of the
resulting choice rule -i.e. ‘stability’- as a success criterion.
We know from some previous work of the present author (see Vannucci (2000,
2002)) that neo-parlamentary and mixed semi-presidential strongly-core stable
government forms can be devised even in multiparty environments provided
that a collegial majority formation rule is enacted, which means that there is
(electoral appointment of) only one admissible minimal majority coalition for
each legislature, i.e. in order-theoretic jargon the set of all powerful or ‘winning’
coalition is indeed a principal order ﬁlter as deﬁned below.
The present paper extends the foregoing results to the case of constitutional
umpires. A constitutional umpire (the President under most parliamentary or
neo-parliamentary contemporary constitutions) is deﬁn e di no u rf r a m e w o r ka sa
player that is endowed with veto power concerning early demotion of the execu-
tive including possibly its head and/or early legislature termination. Working in
a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is consis-
tent with strong core-stability of a neo-parliamentary or mixed semi-presidential
government form provided that the majority formation rule is collegial.
2 Model and results
To begin with, let us recall some basic notions on eﬀectivity-coalitional game
forms that will be needed in the ensuing analysis.
Let N,X be two non-empty sets (denoting the player set and the outcome
set, respectively), and P(N),P(X) their power sets. An eﬀectivity function (EF)
on (N,X) is a function E:P(N) → P(P(X)) such that :
EF 1) E(N)=P(X)\{∅} ; EF 2) E(∅)=∅ ; EF 3) X ∈ E(S) for any
S ∈ P(N)\{∅} ; EF 4) ∅ / ∈ E(S) for any S ∈ P(N)\{∅}.
The following properties of an EF will be repeatedly taken into consideration:
N-Monotonicity: An EF E on (N,X) is N − monotonic if for any A ⊆ X
and S ⊆ T ⊆ N, A ∈ E(S) entails A ∈ E(T).
X-Monotonicity: An EF E on (N,X) is X−monotonic if for any A ⊆ B ⊆ X,
and S ⊆ N, A ∈ E(S) entails B ∈ E(S).
Monotonicity: An EF E on (N,X) is monotonic if it is both N-monotonic
and X-monotonic.
Convexity: An EF E on (N,X) is convex if for any S,T ⊆ N, and A,B ⊆
X,A ∈ E(S) and B ∈ E(T) imply that either A ∩ B ∈ E(S ∪ T) or A ∪ B ∈
E(S ∩ T).
Clearly enough, the foregoing properties are not mutually independent. In
particular, it is easily checked that convexity N-monotonicity.
The usually suggested interpretation of the statement ‘A ∈ E(S)’i st h a t
coalition S can “force” the outcome within subset A, a c c o r d i n gt ot h er u l e so fo f
an underlying decision mechanism that is left unspeciﬁed. In particular, an EF
2E on (N,X) is said to be α-strategically playable if there exists a strategic game
form G =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h) with (surjective) outcome function h ∈ XΠi∈NSi
such that E = Eα(G),w h e r eEα(G)(∅)=∅ and for any nonempty S ⊆ N,
Eα(G)(S)=
½
A ⊆ X : there exists sS =( si)i∈S ∈
Q
i∈S Si





As mentioned above, coalitional stability of an EF will be assessed using the
core as the basic solution concept.
Deﬁnition 1 (Core stability of an EF)L e tE be an EF on (N,X) and D(N,X)
a domain of preference proﬁles Â=( Âi)i∈N ,w h e r e —f o ra n yi ∈ N — Âiis a
suitable binary relation on X. The core of E at Â —written Core(E,Â) —i st h e
set of (E,Â)-undominated outcomes i.e.
Core(E,Â)=
½
x ∈ X : for no S ⊆ N,B ⊆ X,B ∈ E(S)
and b Âi x for any b ∈ B,i ∈ S
¾
.
An EF E on (N,X) is (core-)stable on D(N,X) if Core(E,Â) 6= ∅ for
any Â∈ D(N,X) and unstable otherwise.
As it happens, core-stability of E cannot guarantee that an (E,Â)-dominated
outcome be dominated through some subset including some core-outcome of
(E,Â) (see e.g. Abdou, Keiding(1991)).This motivates a stronger stability re-
quirement ﬁrst introduced by Demange(1987), namely:
Deﬁnition 2 (Strong core stability of an EF). Let E be an EF on (N,X) and
D = D(N,X) a domain of preference proﬁl e sa sd e ﬁned above. E is said to
be strongly (core-)stable over D if for any proﬁle Â∈ D(N,X) the following
holds true: for any x ∈ X\C(E,Â) ap a i rS ⊆ N,B ⊆ X exists such that
B ∩ C(E,Â) 6= ∅,B∈ E(S) and b Âi x for any b ∈ B,i ∈ S.
In particular, the ensuing analysis will rely on the following basic and very
well-known facts:
i) convex EFs are strongly stable on a few large domains of preference pro-
ﬁles, including the domain of all preference proﬁles consisting of weak orders
with a maximum (see e.g. Abdou and Keiding (1991)); ii) any superadditive
and X-monotonic EF is α-strategically playable.
The ‘president’o r‘head of the executive’ is denoted as player ⊥,and the
‘umpire’ as player >.T h e ( n − player,h − sized)‘ assembly’ (v,h) ∈ Zn
+ ×
Z+\{0}—with weight proﬁle v =( v1,..,v n) such that
Pn
i=1 vi = h—c o m p r i s e s
h seats which are divided among a ﬁnite number of parties, denoted as players
1,2,..,n, with n ≥ 3:t h ev o t i n gw e i g h tvi of party i denotes the (non-negative,
integer) number of seats under i’s control. We posit N = {1,.,n} and denote by
V (n,h) the set of all n-agent weight proﬁles for a h-sized assembly. Decisions
are taken by the assembly using a rule that is implicitly deﬁned by a majority
formation rule W∗ : ∆ ⊆ V (n,h) → P(P(N))\{∅} such that :
(MF1) : for any v ∈ ∆, W∗(v) is an order ﬁlter of (P(N),⊆) i.e. for any
S,T ⊆ N , S ∈ W∗(v) and S ⊆ T entail T ∈ W∗(v) ,a n d
(MF2) : W∗(v) ⊆ W(v), where W(v) is the set of all simple majority
coalitions at v, namely coalition S ∈ W(v) if and only if
P
i∈S vi ≥ bh/2c+1.
3Thus, a majority formation rule W∗(.) determines — for any admissible
weight proﬁle v ∈ ∆— the (non-empty) order-ﬁlter W∗(v) ⊆ P(N) of admissible
majority coalitions .
As e tW∗(v) of admissible majorities for assembly (v,h) is said to be collegial
if W∗(v) is a principal (or, equivalently, latticial) ﬁlter i.e. a (majority)
coalition S ⊆ N exists such that W∗(v)={T ⊆ N : S ⊆ T} (S is also referred
to as the basic coalition of W∗(v)). Also, W∗(v) is minimal collegial if it is
collegial and its basic coalition is minimal (a majority coalition S ∈ W(v) is
said to be minimal if T/ ∈ W(v) for any T ⊆ S,T 6= S).
A majority formation rule W∗(.) is said to be (minimal) collegial on ∆ if
W∗(v) is (minimal) collegial at any v ∈ ∆, and non-collegial otherwise.
Moreover, without any real loss of generality, the outcome or policy space X
is taken to be decomposable into two distinct non-overlapping jurisdictions, i.e.
X = Y ×Z, where Y denotes the jurisdiction of the assembly and Z denotes the
presidential jurisdiction. I also assume that two “special” outcome-components
y∗ ∈ Y, z∗ ∈ Z exist (whose exact interpretation will be made dependent on
context as explained below) and that #A ≥ 3 for any A ∈ {Y,Z}, in order to
avoid annoying qualiﬁcations. Moreover, following Vannucci (2000, and 2002)
I shall be able to avoid some irrelevant complications by focussing on strong
assemblies i.e.those assemblies whose two-coalitions partitions must include
one majority. Strong assemblies are characterized by a strong weight proﬁle as
deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 3 (Strong weight proﬁles)A nn−dimensional weight proﬁle v for a





i∈N\S vi ≥ bh/2c+1. The set of all such n−dimensional h−sized
strong weight proﬁl e si sd e n o t e db yV ∗(n,h).
Notation 4 The following notation will be used: a parameterized family E(.)
o fE F sw i l la l s ob er e f e r r e dt oa sa nEF-scheme (EFS) . An EF-scheme E(.)
with parameter set V is said to enjoy property P on V if and only if E(v) is P
for any v ∈ V. In particular, when referring to stability properties it will be said
that E(.) is (strongly) stable on (V,D) if and only if E(v) is (strongly) stable
on D for any v ∈ V, and unstable otherwise.
We are now ready to introduce our EF-based models of government forms
with umpires. It should be noticed here that the stability problem of such a
government form amounts to a parameterized version of a standard implementa-
tion problem by means of coalitional game forms. Indeed, solving the stability
problem in the foregoing frameworks reduces to identifying an EF-scheme E
such that for any v ∈ V , Core(E(v),.): D →→ X is a non-empty (and Pareto-
eﬃcient) social choice correspondence.
As mentioned above, we regard a constitutional umpire as a player that is
empowered to check those unilateral decisions on the part of the president or
of the assembly that have a direct impact on the whole system as opposed to
their respective jurisdictions. Hence in particular the constitutional umpire’s
4support is required in order to demote the president or terminate the legislature
i.e. replace the current assembly.
Let us start with a stylized version of (neo-)parliamentary government forms
(PAGF). Here, PAGF are taken to be characterized by the power of the assembly
—i.e. of its eﬀective majorities—to remove the executive and/or block its actions.
M o r e o v e r ,w ef o c u so nt h es o m e w h a ts i m p l i ﬁed ‘symmetric’arrangement that
requires appointment of a —possibly new—president and a new umpire whenever
the “old” assembly is replaced. Thus, the weight-parameterized eﬀectivity func-
tion of a PAGF such that election of a new assembly always involves election of
a new president and a new umpire can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 5 ( The EF-scheme EPA(W∗(.)) of a symmetric neo-parliamentary
government form with umpire)
Let v be an n−dimensional weight proﬁle for a h−sized assembly, W∗(v) the
non-empty set of eﬀective majorities at v, N+ = N ∪ {⊥,>},X=( Y \{y∗}×
Z\{z∗}) ∪ {(y∗,z∗)}. Then, EPA(W∗(v)) is the EF on (N+,X) as deﬁned by
the following rules: for any S ⊆ N+,B ⊆ X, B ∈ EPA(W∗(v))(S) iﬀ one of
the following clauses applies
(i) B 6= ∅ and S ⊇ M ∪ {⊥,>} for some M ∈ W∗(v) ;
(ii) (y∗,z∗) ∈ B, ⊥∈S and S ∩ M 6= ∅ for any M ∈ W∗(v);
(iii) (y∗,z∗) ∈ B, > ∈ S and S ∩ M 6= ∅ for any M ∈ W∗(v) ;
(iv) (y∗,z∗) ∈ B and {⊥,>} ⊆ S ;
(v) B = X and S 6= ∅.
In words, a coalition is all-powerful if and only if it comprises both an ef-
fective majority, the president, and the umpire. An eﬀective majority has full
control over the jurisdiction of the assembly (including of course the right to
call for new elections) provided it is supported by the umpire.A n e ﬀectively
blocking coalition can also call for new elections and possibly remove the pres-
ident (calling for new presidential elections) if it is supported by the umpire.
Hence, the president only retains conditional control of her jurisdiction, given
the possibility of being removed e.g. by means of a non-conﬁdence vote.
Proposition 6 Let V ∗(n,h) the set of strong weight proﬁles, W∗(.) a col-
legial majority formation rule on V ∗(n,h), EPAU(W∗(.)) as y m m e t r i cn e o -
parliamentary government form with umpire, and D the set of all proﬁles of
weak orders with a maximum on the outcome space. Then EPAU(W∗(.)) is
convex —hence strongly core-stable— on D.
Proof. To begin with, notice that EPAU(W∗(v)) is a monotonic EF, by
deﬁnition. To check convexity of EPAU(W∗(v)) whenever W∗(.) is collegial, i.e.
—for any v ∈ V ∗(n,h)—W∗(v)={M ⊆ N : M ⊇ M∗} is a (principal) latticial
ﬁlter, with M∗ as its unique generating (majority) coalition, we rely on a direct
proof by enumeration of cases. Indeed, take A,B ⊆ X,S,T ⊆ N,v ∈ V ∗(n,h)
such that (α)A ∈ EPAU(W∗(v))(S), and (β)B ∈ EPAU(W∗(v))(T). Several
diﬀerent cases are to be distinguished according to which of the deﬁning clauses
of EPAU(W∗(v)) underlie (α) and (β).
5If both (α) and (β) rely on clause (i) -written (α : i,β : i) namely S ⊇
M0 ∪ {⊥,>} and T ⊇ M00 ∪ {⊥,>} for some M0,M00 ∈ W∗(v),then S ∩ T ⊇
M∗ ∪{⊥,>} hence clearly A∪B ∈ EPAU(W∗(v))(S ∩T) (by clause (i) itself).
Similarly, if (α : ii,β : ii) then S ∩M∗ 6= ∅ 6= T ∩M∗, (y∗,z∗) ∈ A∩B and ⊥∈
S∩T whence A∩B ∈ EPAU(W∗(v))(S∪T) (by clause (ii)).The case (α : iii,β :
iii) implies without loss of generality(w.l.o.g.) that S ∩ M∗ 6= ∅ 6= T ∩ M∗with
> ∈ S∩T and (y∗,z∗) ∈ A∩B whence again A∩B ∈ EPAU(W∗(v))(S∪T),b y
clause (iii). In case (α : iv,β : iv) one has (y∗,z∗) ∈ A∩B and {⊥,>} ⊆ S ∩T,
hence both A ∩ B ∈ EPAU(W∗(v))(S ∪ T) and A ∪ B ∈ EPAU(W∗(v))(S ∩ T)
hold. Moreover, whenever (α : v) or (β : v) i st h ec a s e—h e n c eX ∈ {A,B}—
it follows that {A,B}3A ∩ B ∈ EPAU(W∗(v))(S ∪ T) by clause (v). Next
consider the cases (γ : i,δ : ii), {α,β} = {γ,δ} where without loss of generality
A 6= ∅,(y∗,z∗) ∈ B,S ⊇ M∗ ∪ {⊥,>},T∩ M∗ 6= ∅,a n d⊥∈T : here, A ∪ B ∈
EPAU(W∗(v))(S∩T), by clause (ii). If (γ : i,δ : iii),{γ,δ} = {α,β} applies, i.e.
w.l.o.g. A 6= ∅,(y∗,z∗) ∈ B,S ⊇ M∗ ∪ {⊥,>},> ∈ T, and T ∩ M∗ 6= ∅, again
A ∪ B ∈ EPAU(W∗(v))(S ∩ T), by clause (iii). If (γ : i,δ : iv),{γ,δ} = {α,β}
applies, i.e. w.l.o.g. A 6= ∅,(y∗,z∗) ∈ B,S ⊇ M∗ ∪ {⊥,>} and {⊥,>} ⊆ T
whence A∪B ∈ EPAU(W∗(v))(S∩T). Now consider the two remaining relevant
classes of cases with (γ : ii),γ∈ {α,β},n a m e l yw i t h(y∗,z∗) ∈ A , ⊥∈S and
-w.l.o.g.-S ∩ M∗ 6= ∅.If (δ : iii),δ ∈ {α,β}\{ γ} i.e. —w.l.o.g.—T ∩ M∗ 6= ∅,
> ∈ T,a n d(y∗,z∗) ∈ B, then —by each one of clauses (ii),(iii) and (iv)—A∩B ∈
EPAU(W(v))(S ∪ T).O t h e r w i s e (δ : iv),δ ∈ {α,β}\{ γ}, i.e. (y∗,z∗) ∈ B,
and {⊥,>} ⊆ T whence again A ∩ B ∈ EPAU(W(v))(S ∪ T) by clause (iv).
Finally, we have the last two relevant cases (γ : iii,δ : iv),{γ,δ} = {α,β},
namely—w.l.o.g.— (y∗,z∗) ∈ A ∩ B,> ∈ S, S ∩ M∗ 6= ∅, and {⊥,>} ⊆ T ,w h i c h
jointly imply —by clause (iii) or (iv)— A ∩ B ∈ EPAU(W∗(v))(S ∪ T).
Let us now turn to the mixed semi-presidential case. Here we consider
a semi-presidential government form (SPGF) with umpire with the following
basic features: the president/head of the executive can terminate the assembly
while keeping its oﬃce but only provided she gets support from the umpire.
This arrangement is embodied in the following deﬁnition, namely
Deﬁnition 7 (The EF-scheme EFSPU(W∗(.)) of a semi-presidential govern-
ment form with umpire ). Let v,W∗(v),N+ be as previously deﬁned , and
X∗ =( Y \{y∗}×Z\{z∗}) ∪ ({y∗}×Z). Then, ESPU(W∗(v)) is the EF on
(N+,X∗) deﬁned as follows : for any S ⊆ N+,A⊆ X∗,A∈ ESPU(W∗(v))(S)
if and only if
(i) A 6= ∅ and S ⊇ M ∪ {⊥,>} for some M ∈ W∗(v) or
(ii) (y∗,z) ∈ A for some z ∈ Z ,a n d{⊥,>} ⊆ S or
(iii) A ⊇ {y∗}×Z , > ∈ S and S ∩ M 6= ∅ for any M ∈ W∗(v) or
(iv) A = X∗ and S 6= ∅.
We ask again the— by now—familiar question concerning stability of ESPU(W∗(v))
and its possible dependence on the features of W∗(v). The answer is summarized
by the following proposition:
6Proposition 8 Let V ∗(n,h) the set of strong weight proﬁles, W∗(.) a collegial
majority formation rule on V ∗(n,h), ESPU(W∗(.)) the EF-scheme of a mixed
semi-presidential government form with umpire, and D the set of all proﬁles
of weak orders with a maximum on the outcome space. Then ESPU(W∗(.)) is
convex —hence strongly core-stable— on D.
Proof. To begin with, notice that ESPU(W∗(v)) is a monotonic EF, by
deﬁnition. To check convexity of ESPU(W∗(v)) whenever W∗(.) is collegial, i.e.
—for any v ∈ V ∗(n,h)—W∗(v)={M ⊆ N : M ⊇ M∗} is a (principal) latticial
ﬁlter, with M∗ as its unique generating (majority) coalition, we rely again on
a direct proof by enumeration of cases. Indeed, take A,B ⊆ X,S,T ⊆ N,v ∈
V ∗(n,h) such that (α)A ∈ ESPU(W∗(v))(S), and (β)B ∈ ESPU(W∗(v))(T).
Several diﬀerent cases are to be distinguished according to which of the deﬁning
clauses of ESPU(W∗(v)) underlie (α) and (β).
If both (α) and (β) rely on clause (i) -written (α : i,β : i) namely S ⊇
M0∪{⊥,>} and T ⊇ M00∪{⊥,>} for some M0,M00 ∈ W∗(v),then S∩T ⊇ M∗∪
{⊥,>} hence clearly A∪B ∈ ESPU(W∗(v))(S ∩T) (by clause (i) itself). Simi-
larly, if (α : ii,β : ii) then S∩T ⊇ {⊥,>},whence A∪B ∈ ESPU(W∗(v))(S∩T)
by clause (ii). If (α : iii,β : iii) then A∩ B ⊇ {y∗}×Z,> ∈ S ∩ T, and w.l.o.g.
S ∩ M∗ 6= ∅ 6= T ∩ M∗ : therefore A ∩ B ∈ E(S ∪ T) by clause (iii). Moreover,
whenever (α : iv) or (β : iv) i st h ec a s e—h e n c eX ∈ {A,B}— it follows that
{A,B}3A ∩ B ∈ ESPU(W∗(v))(S ∪ T) by clause (iv).
Next, consider the cases (γ : i,δ : ii), {α,β} = {γ,δ} where without loss of
generality A 6= ∅,(y∗,z) ∈ B for some z ∈ Z,S ⊇ M∗ ∪ {⊥,>},{⊥,>} ⊆ T:
here, A ∪ B ∈ ESPU(W∗(v))(S ∩ T), by clause (ii). Moreover, if (γ : i,δ :
iii),{γ,δ} = {α,β} applies, i.e. w.l.o.g. A 6= ∅,B ⊇ {y∗}×Z, S⊇ M∗ ∪
{⊥,>},> ∈ T, and T ∩M∗ 6= ∅, again A∪B ∈ ESPU(W∗(v))(S∩T),b yc l a u s e
(iii). Finally, we have the last class of relevant cases (γ : ii,δ : iii),{γ,δ} =
{α,β}, namely—w.l.o.g.— (y∗,z) ∈ A for some z ∈ Z,B ⊇ {y∗}×Z,{⊥,>} ⊆
S, and T ∩ M∗ 6= ∅ which jointly imply —by clause (iii) or (iv)— A ∩ B ∈
EPAU(W∗(v))(S ∪ T) by clause (ii).
Remark 9 The proofs of Propositions 6 and 8 provided above are direct. Alter-
native proofs could be devised relying on a general result on suﬃcient conditions
for convexity of coalitional game forms as presented in Vannucci (2004).
Remark 10 It should be remarked that since for any v ∈ V (n,h),E PAU(W∗(v))
and ESPU(W∗(v)) are both monotonic and convex they are in particular α-
strategically playable i.e. they are implementable by means of suitable mecha-
nisms in strategic form (see e.g. Otten, Borm, Storcken and Tijs (1995)).
3C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
It is sometimes claimed that whenever the premier or chief of the executive
is appointed directly by means of general elections there is no possible signif-
icant role for a president/umpire. The foregoing results make quite clear that
7this is deﬁnitely not the case. Moreover, when combined with collegial major-
ity formation rules, the existence of a constitutional umpire is consistent with
the requirement of strong core-stability for government forms in a multiparty
environment. Hence consistency between the existence of proper ‘checks and
balances’ and stability of government forms seems to be in principle well within
the reach of clever constitutional design.
Acknowledgements: Earlier versions of this paper were presented at IMGTA
XV, Urbino, July 9-12, 2003, and at the Society for Economic Design Fourth
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